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In markets for many fruits, vegetables, and an increasing number of imported goods,
consumers cannot discern the quality of a product prior to purchase and can never identify
its producer. Producing high-quality, safe goods is costly for a firm and raises the collective
reputation for quality shared with its rivals. Minimum quality standards improve welfare.
If consumers observe the country of origin of a product, quality, profits, and welfare
increase. Exports from countries with more exporting firms are of lower quality and sell
for lower prices. If one country imposes a minimum quality standard on its exports while
other countries do not, consumers benefit. As for sellers, the regulation raises the profits
of firms in the country with regulation and lowers the profits of firms in countries without
regulation.
1 Introduction
In many markets, consumers cannot evaluate the quality of a good before
buying it. How can the the pleasure of consuming a French brie or a Califor-
nia navel orange be judged without consuming them? How can the feel of a
∗We would like to thank Jim Adams, Axel Anderson, Heski Bar-Isaac, Tilman Bo¨rgers,
Will Fogel, Wenting Hu, Greg Lewis, Tom Lyon, Jill McCluskey, Marc Melitz, Ariel Pakes,
and Nicola Persico for helpful comments and insights.
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Bic ball-point pen be determined without writing with it? Consumers assess
the quality of such goods by purchasing them repeatedly and eventually learn
to anticipate their quality.
When the quality of a good cannot be discerned prior to purchase, we
call it an “experience good.” But there are really two distinct classes of
experience goods. In the first, the consumer knows the identity of the pro-
ducer. In the second, it is either impossible or too costly for the consumer
to identify the producer. A Bic ballpoint pen belongs to the first class of
experience goods whereas a French brie belongs to the second class—which
farm produced the product is not apparent.
Although little attention has been paid in the IO literature to this sec-
ond class of experience goods, it is becoming the subject of countless news
stories. At this moment, U.S. beef is the subject of massive protests in
South Korea because of fears that it will expose Koreans to mad cow dis-
ease. Meanwhile, U.S. consumers—having experienced Chinese toothpaste,
cold medicines, toys, and other products containing lead, antifreeze, and
other poisons—are developing an aversion to the “Made in China” label.
When goods are imported from distant countries, identifying the pro-
ducer of a particular product may be too costly for a consumer. But not all
experience goods in this second class are imports. Who knows which partic-
ular apple orchard produced a given Washington apple or what orange grove
produced a particular California navel? In some circumstances, outputs from
different firms are pooled together before their quality is assessed. Olmstead
and Rhode (2003) describe the case of cotton grown in the South in the
early twentieth century. Partly because of the high cost of testing quality,
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sometimes only samples of cotton pooled from many growers were tested.
This prevented an individual farmer from increasing his own specific repu-
tation. A similar situation recently confronted tomato growers. Although
tomatoes are grown on separate farms, they are pooled together for wash-
ing and processing. In the recent salmonella outbreak, it was thought that
the contamination originated after the tomatoes from the various individ-
ual growers were pooled. In such cases, an individual grower has no way to
distinguish the quality of his produce from that of his competitors.
Producers of this second class of experience goods are in a difficult situ-
ation. They know the quality of the goods they produce. But they realize
that there is no way to distinguish the quality of their product from the
quality of the other products lumped together in the consumer’s mind. They
share a “collective reputation.” Not surprisingly, a producer does not have
as much incentive to make a product of high quality as he would if consumers
distinguished his products from those of his competitors.
In markets exhibiting collective reputation, high-quality production can
be difficult to maintain. Akerlof’s famous lemons paper (1970) can be in-
terpreted as a characterization of the dangers of collective reputation in the
used-car market. However, in Akerlof’s model, qualities are exogenous. In
our model, we show that firms will choose to produce low-quality products
when they share a collective reputation. To prevent this degradation of
quality, minimum quality standards are often imposed as a form of quality
(and consumer) protection. Concern for health and safety first prompted
congressional action in the 1880s and 1890s on issues ranging from “pickles
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dyed with copper salts” to “trichinosis in beef.”1 In 1891, worried by the
declining reputation of American meat abroad, Congress sent inspectors to
all slaughterhouses preparing meat for export. Throughout the early twen-
tieth century, policymakers struggled to create meaningful minimum quality
standards. In 1938, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act,
legislative action that strengthened the regulatory power of the government.
By the mid-1960s, nearly half of all food products were regulated in some
way. Today, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers fee-based vol-
untary grading of nearly all fruits and vegetables. The USDA also enforces
mandatory quality standards in 26 industries, regulating over four billion
dollars in business annually.
Perhaps because there has been little discussion of this second class of
experience goods, such attempts to impose minimum quality standards are
often interpreted by the antitrust authorities (rightly or wrongly) as attempts
to cartelize the market. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
made the following comment about the plan of the Federal agricultural mar-
keting board governing Michigan tart cherries to impose minimum quality
standards: “For the reasons set forth in these comments, DOJ also opposes
those provisions in the proposed marketing order providing for minimum
quality standards for tart cherries. We oppose those provisions because they
also appear to establish volume controls; that is, they appear to give the ad-
ministrative board the discretion to vary quality standards from year to year
in response to the size of the cherry crop.” The response of DOJ raises an in-
1Gardner (2004). The following historical summary draws heavily from Gardner’s work,
a must for those interested in USDA’s employment of minimum quality standards.
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teresting set of questions. In an oligopoly, must the imposition of a minimum
quality standard result in smaller aggregate output and lower welfare?
Klein-Leﬄer (1981) and Shapiro (1983) considered markets for experi-
ence goods of the first type. In their formulations, the quality of products
cannot be distinguished prior to purchase, but consumers can identify the
producer of each product. In the steady state of Shapiro’s model, identical
firms exhibit heterogeneous behavior with some specialized to one quality
and receiving one price and other firms specialized to different qualities and
receiving different prices. In these formulations, one firm’s quality choice has
no effect on another firm’s future reputation for quality.
In contrast, the recent IO literature on “collective reputations” investi-
gates the situation where consumers do not distinguish the products of dif-
ferent agents (be they firms or farms)—such as U.S. tomatoes, Washington
apples, Chinese toys, and so forth. As a result, all firms sell at a common
price and share a common reputation for quality. The first paper in this
literature was Winfree and McCluskey (2005).2 In their model, output is
exogenous, entry is prohibited, and firms are constrained to offer a single
quality. Under these assumptions, Winfree and McCluskey show that when
firms share a collective reputation, they have an incentive in the steady state
of their dynamic model to free-ride and to produce low-quality goods. In a
recent working paper, Rouvie`re and Soubeyran (2008) retain the assumption
2Tirole (1996) coined the term “collective reputation” and was the first to analyze
the phenomenon. However, his focus was not on the strategic interaction of firms but
on the reputations of workers. In Tirole’s formulation, an agent’s own past behavior is
imperfectly observed and he is assessed not only on the basis of his own past actions but
also on the collective past actions of others. In contrast, past behavior of our firms is not
observed and they have no individual reputations, only a collective one.
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of a fixed output and the constraint that firms choose a single quality but
permit entry. They show that free-riding causes entry into the market to be
suboptimal.
Our paper is closest to a working paper by Fleckinger (2007). Both our
papers, although static, build on Winfree and McCluskey (2005) by endoge-
nizing the quantity decision. But because the two studies were developed in-
dependently, they are otherwise based on different assumptions. Fleckinger,
for example, constrains each firm to a single quality, whereas firms in our
model are free to produce multiple qualities. Fleckinger assumes that in-
verse demand is multiplicatively separable and, in addition, that one of the
multiplicative factors is linear. We work with a much wider class of inverse
demand functions and consider the implications of this abstraction. Unlike
Fleckinger, we also consider equilibria in which consumers know the country
of origin of the imported experience good. If some countries impose mini-
mum quality standards on their exporting firms while other countries leave
their exporters unregulated, the imposition of regulation makes consumers
better off. It increases the profits of firms in the countries with regulations
and lowers them in countries without regulations.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we present our benchmark
model in which each profit-maximizing firm chooses both quantity and qual-
ity in a simultaneous-move game. Section 3 considers the case where con-
sumers are able to identify the country of origin of the product. Section 4
concludes the paper.
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2 Model of Oligopoly
2.1 A Preliminary Simplification
Suppose n firms simultaneously choose how to distribute their production of a
good over the quality set K = [0,∞). We define the strategy of a firm i to be
the tuple ξi = (µi, qi), where µi is a probability measure on the Borel algebra
of K and qi ∈ [0,∞) is the total output of firm i.3 Note that mass points
are allowed. Let Q = q1 + · · · + qn be the total output in the market. The
per unit cost of producing a quality k is given by c(k) : K → [0,∞), which
is strictly increasing away from 0 and strictly convex. Given a probability
measure µi, the total cost bill of firm i is:
C(µi, qi) = qi
∫
K
c(k)dµi (1)
where we use the Lebesgue integral.
We define the collective reputation in the market by:
R(µ1, ..., µn) =
n∑
i=1
qi
Q
∫
K
kdµi. (2)
We assume consumers are unable to discern the individual quality of any
firm’s good prior to consumption and can never determine which firm pro-
duced the good. Rather, consumers only observe the collective reputation
of the experience good. Inverse demand is given by the function P (Q,R) :
[0,∞)×K → [0,∞). Given a strategy profile ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξn) of the n firms,
3We define the Borel algebra of K to be the minimal σ-algebra containing the closed
interval subsets of K.
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the profit of a firm i is given by:
Πi(ξi, ξ−i) = qi[P (Q,R)−
∫
K
c(k)dµi], (3)
where Q and R are as given above.
This formulation is a substantial departure from the previous literature on
collective reputation. Winfree and McCluskey (2005), Fleckinger (2007), and
others arbitrarily restrict each firm to a single quality level. The possibility
therefore remains that Nash equilibria where firms produce several qualities
at once have been ruled out by assumption. In addition, the Nash equilibria
which have been identified in the literature may be artifacts of the restriction
that no firm can offer multiple qualities. That is, once this restriction is
relaxed, a firm may have a profitable deviation from the strategy profile
identified in the literature as a Nash equilibrium.
The prior literature assumes strict convexity of the cost function, however,
and this permits us to establish the following surprising result.
Theorem 2.1 If the per-unit cost function of each firm is strictly convex,
there can be no Nash equilibrium of the game where some active firm i (qi >
0) chooses a probability measure that assigns mass to more than one point.
Thus, the restriction invoked in these papers does not limit the generality of
their results.
Proof Suppose the contrary—that we have a Nash equilibrium strategy pro-
file ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξn) in which a firm i chooses an output qi > 0 and a probability
measure µi which does not consist of a single mass point. Figure I will be
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helpful in understanding the result. Let k¯i =
∫
K
kdµi. Let us consider the
the strategy ξ?i = (µ
?
i , qi) of firm i, where µ
?
i ({k¯i}) = 1 and µ?i = 0 for
ki 6= k¯i. Suppose the strategy profile of the other firms, denoted by ξ−i, is
unchanged. It is clear that the total output and the collective reputation in
the market does not change. Thus, the price firm i receives does not change
as well. However, since the per unit cost function is strictly convex in qual-
ity, by Jensen’s inequality we have that
∫
K
c(k)dµ?i = c(k¯i) <
∫
K
c(k)dµi.
Thus firm i’s cost bill is lower, which implies profits are higher. Therefore,
firm i has a profitable unilateral deviation and ξ fails to constitute a Nash
equilibrium.
By a similar argument, no Nash equilibrium in which firms are constrained
to choose a single quality would be eliminated if they were allowed instead
to produce multiple qualities. This follows since, by Jensen’s inequality, a
unilateral deviation to multiple qualities is always strictly less profitable than
a deviation to a single-quality profile with the same mean and, by hypothesis,
no such single-quality deviation is profitable.
2.2 Existence, Characterization, and Uniqueness of
Nash Equilibrium
Given the previous discussion, we now assume without loss of generality that
each firm chooses to produce a single quality. Inverse demand depends now
on the aggregate quantity of goods sold and on their quality averaged across
the firms, which we again refer to as their collective reputation (denoted R).
More precisely, collective reputation is now the quantity-weighted average of
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the qualities the n firms sell:
R =
qiki
qi +Q−i
+
∑
j 6=i qjkj
qi +Q−i
. (4)
The variables q and k in (4) denote quantity and quality, respectively; the
subscripts i and−i refer, respectively, to firm i and to every other firm; Q−i =∑
j 6=i qj and k−i = (kj)j 6=i. The right-hand side of (4) is undefined when
qi = Q−i = 0. We specify inverse demand as follows. Consider P˜ (Q,R) :
[0,∞)×K → [0,∞), which is twice differentiable; strictly decreasing, strictly
concave in Q; and strictly increasing, strictly concave in R. We assume that
P˜2(Q,R) → 0 as R → ∞ for all Q and that, for all R, there exists Q¯(R)
such that P˜ (Q¯(R), R) = 0. Note that Pi refers to the i
th partial derivative
of P and Pij refers to the ij
th second derivative of P . We assume that
Q¯(R) is continuous, strictly increasing in R, and Q¯(0) > 0. Now for a given
reputation R, inverse demand is given by:
P (Q,R) =
 P˜ (Q,R); if Q < Q¯(R)0; if Q ≥ Q¯(R). (5)
Note that for a given R, the inverse demand function is everywhere contin-
uous; however, there is a single kink at Q = Q¯(R). As for the per unit cost
function, we continue to assume that c(k) is strictly increasing away from 0.
We moreover assume that it is twice differentiable and c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
Consider the game where each firm simultaneously chooses its output and
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quality to maximize the following payoff function:
qi[P (qi +Q−i, R(ki, qi, k−i, Q−i))− c(ki)]. (6)
We define firm i’s profit whenever it is inactive (qi = 0) as zero. This assign-
ment never conflicts with (6) since that equation, evaluated at qi = 0, gives
the same result when Q−i > 0 and is undefined when Q−i = 0.
Since firm i maximizes profits, its decisions must satisfy the following pair
of complementary slackness (denoted c.s.) conditions for Q−i > 0:
qi ≥ 0, P (Q,R)− c(ki) + qiP1(Q,R) + qiP2(Q,R)∂R
∂qi
≤ 0, c.s. (7)
ki ≥ 0, qi[P2(Q,R)∂R
∂ki
− c′(ki)] ≤ 0, c.s. (8)
where, from (4), ∂R
∂ki
= qi/Q and
∂R
∂qi
= (ki −R)/Q.
The first three terms of equation (7) are standard. They reflect the excess
of the marginal gain from selling another unit over the marginal cost of pro-
ducing it. The last term, qiP2(Q,R)
∂R
∂qi
, is novel and captures an additional
consequence (beneficial or adverse) of expanding output marginally. If firm
i’s quality is greater than the reputation in the market, then increasing out-
put will increase the collective reputation of the good, which will raise the
price. On the other hand, if firm i’s quality is below average, then increasing
output will decrease the price. The meaning of equation (8) is straightfor-
ward: if the firm produces no output, any quality is optimal; if the firm is
active (qi > 0) and quality is set optimally, then a marginal increase in qual-
ity would raise the revenue from sales of the goods by as much as it raises
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their cost of production.
We suppose that the profit function is pseudoconcave so that when the
first-order conditions are satisfied, a global maximum has been achieved. We
first note that for n > 1, there may exist trivial equilibria in which the
equilibrium price is zero and, therefore, each active firm produces at the
minimum quality.4 We seek to establish the following:
Theorem 2.2 There exist one or more non-trivial pure-strategy equilibria,
i.e. equilibria with a non-zero price, and they are interior and symmetric.
Proof See Appendix A.
Given that non-trivial equilibrium strategies are interior and symmetric,
qi = Q/n > 0 and ki = k > 0. Hence, we may re-write (7) and (8) as follows:
P (Q, k)− c(k) + Q
n
P1(Q, k) = 0 (9)
and
P2(Q, k)
n
− c′(k) = 0. (10)
While uniqueness is only assured in certain circumstances,5 the comparative
4Suppose there exists Q0 > Q¯(0) such that for all Q ≥ Q0, P (Q, k) < c(k) for all
k > 0. We know such an output will exist when P˜12 ≤ 0. Now suppose each firm follows
the strategy (Q0, 0), thus receiving zero profit. No firm has a profitable deviation. Given
any deviation in one firm’s output, total output will still weakly exceed Q0. Therefore,
the profit any firm can achieve by deviating is bounded above by zero. In other words,
the specified profile of strategies is a Nash equilibrium.
5If one assumes that P˜12 = 0, then k˘(Q) becomes a horizontal ray. Since Q˘(k) is
a well-defined function, there then can only be one point of intersection, i.e. a unique
equilibrium. We conjecture that if P˜12 is small (but nonzero) then one can also prove
uniqueness. More generally, if we were to place certain restrictions on the signs of cross
partial third derivatives we would also be able to get uniqueness.
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statics and welfare considerations of the following sections hold at any non-
trivial equilibrium of the game.
2.3 Regulation and Welfare
We now consider the economic welfare that is achieved under such equilibria
and, more importantly, the role regulations can play in increasing welfare.
We define economic welfare by:
W (Q, k) =
∫ Q
0
P (u, k)du−Qc(k). (11)
A social planner seeking to maximize economic welfare would choose Q and
k to solve:
P (Q, k) = c(k) (12)∫ Q
0
P2(u, k)du = Qc
′(k). (13)
Note that if additive separability is assumed (P˜12 = 0), equation (13) reduces
to P2(Q, k) = c
′(k). Since the left-hand side is independent of aggregate sales
(Q) and strictly decreases in k while the right-hand side is strictly increasing
in k, this equation uniquely defines the socially optimal quality.
Recall that in the market setting, every firm sets its quality in the Nash
equilibrium to solve P2(Q, k) = nc
′(k). This implies that under additive
separability, the equilibrium quality level emerging in the market setting
will be socially optimal under monopoly and suboptimal under oligopoly. It
is, therefore, likely that the discrete change from monopoly to duopoly will
be welfare improving: the induced deterioration in quality is apt to have a
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small adverse effect on welfare (no first-order change if n could be increased
marginally), while the expansion in total output will likely have a more sub-
stantial, positive effect on welfare. However, as the market becomes less and
less concentrated, the continued deterioration in quality may depress welfare
and even output. Thus, if the market is highly concentrated, then it may
be optimal for the government to undertake measures to increase competi-
tion. However, after a point increased competition is likely to decrease total
economic welfare.
2.3.1 Positive and Normative Effects of Minimum Quality Stan-
dards (MQS)
Consider the positive and normative effects of an exogenous binding mini-
mum quality standard (MQS) which we denote by k¯. Since the standard
marginally raises quality, its marginal impact on welfare is the following:
dW
dk¯
=
dQ
dk¯
{P (Q, k¯)− c(k¯)}+ [
∫ Q
0
P2(u, k¯)du−Qc′(k¯)]. (14)
Welfare changes because (1) industry output will change (the first term) and
(2), even if industry output did not change, welfare would change because
of the resulting changes in the gross surplus and costs of producing the old
output at a marginally enhanced quality. To calculate the marginal impact
on quantity we totally differentiate equation (9) to find:
dQ
dk¯
=
P2(Q, k¯)− c′(k¯) + QnP12(Q, k¯)
−[P1(Q, k¯)(1 + 1n) + QnP11(Q, k¯)]
. (15)
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The denominator is strictly positive since inverse demand is strictly decreas-
ing and weakly concave in output. Hence, raising the MQS increases aggre-
gate output if the numerator is strictly positive and lowers it otherwise. The
sign of the numerator is ambiguous. If the standard is marginally increased,
the marginal cost of an output increase rises by c′(k¯) and the marginal benefit
of an output increase rises by P2(Q, k¯) +
Q
n
P12(Q, k¯). The sign of the numer-
ator depends on the signs and magnitudes of these respective terms. If the
numerator of (15) is strictly positive, every firm would increase its output in
response to the increase in the MQS. Given equations (14) and (15), we have
the following results:
Theorem 2.3 If inverse demand is additively separable,6 for any binding
MQS below the social optimum, a marginal increase will raise aggregate out-
put and welfare. For any binding MQS above the social optimum, a marginal
increase will decrease aggregate output and welfare.
Given additive separability, we recall that the equilibrium quality equals the
social optimum under monopoly and is strictly less than the social optimum
for less concentrated market structures. This implies that an MQS is only
beneficial when there is more than one firm in the market.
Proof Since inverse demand is additively separable, we have that P12 = 0.
Let k˜ denote the socially optimal quality. That is, k˜ solves the equation
P2(Q, k) = c
′(k). So for k¯ < k˜ we have P2(Q, k¯) > c′(k¯) and the opposite for
k¯ > k˜. Looking at the numerator of equation (15), we therefore find if the
6Henceforth, additive separability of inverse demand implicitly implies that P˜12 =
0. Similarly, any other restrictions on the cross partial of the inverse demand function
implicitly signify a restriction on P˜ (Q,R).
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standard is below the social optimum, a marginal increase will raise output,
while for a standard above the social optimum, a marginal increase will lower
output.
Turning now to equation (14), the term in braces, P (Q, k¯) − c(k¯), is
always strictly positive since P (Q, k¯) − c(k¯) = −Q
n
P1(Q, k¯) > 0. Finally,
by additive separability the last two terms can be rewritten as Q[P2(Q, k¯)−
c′(k¯)]. Again, this expression is strictly positive for a standard below the
social optimum and strictly negative for a standard above the social optimum.
We conclude that welfare is strictly increasing in binding standards below the
social optimum and strictly decreasing in binding standards above the social
optimum.
We have shown that, given the assumption of additive separability, an
MQS can improve welfare under oligopoly market settings. It turns out
that an MQS can improve welfare when there is more than one firm under
considerably more general inverse demand functions. To begin, we need
some notation. Given unregulated equilibrium values (Q?, k?), let ζ(u) =
P2(Q?,k?)
Q?
u. That is, ζ(u) is the line emanating from the origin and passing
through the point (Q?, P2(Q
?, k?)).
Theorem 2.4 Suppose that n ≥ 2 and the unregulated equilibrium admits
values (Q?, k?). If P12 < 0 and |P12| sufficiently small, then an MQS which
just binds will marginally increase output and hence welfare. If P12 > 0 and∫ Q?
0
[P2(u, k
?) − ζ(u)]du > 0, then a MQS which just binds will marginally
increase output and hence welfare.
Proof Since P2(Q
?, k?) = nc′(k?) in equilibrium and the MQS just binds,
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i.e. k¯ = k?, we can reduce equation (15) to:
dQ
dk¯
=
P2(Q
?, k?)(1− 1
n
) + Q
?
n
P12(Q
?, k?)
−[P1(Q?, k?)(1 + 1n) + Q
?
n
P11(Q?, k?)]
. (16)
For n > 1, the first term in the numerator of (16) is strictly positive. If
P12 < 0 and |P12| is sufficiently small, dQdk¯ > 0. Therefore, the first term in
equation (14) is strictly positive. As for the second term in that equation,
when P12 < 0 it is also strictly positive since in that case
∫ Q?
0
P2(u, k
?)du > Q?P2(Q
?, k?) = nQ?c′(k?) > Q?c′(k?). (17)
Suppose instead that P12 > 0. Equation (16) then implies that
dQ
dk¯
> 0.
Thus, the first term in (14) is strictly positive. As for the second term in
(14), when
∫ Q?
0
[P2(u, k
?) − ζ(u)]du > 0, that term is strictly positive (for
n > 1) since
∫ Q?
0
P2(u, k
?)du >
∫ Q?
0
ζ(u)du =
Q?
2
P2(Q
?, k?) ≥ Q
?
n
P2(Q
?, k?) = Q?c′(k?).
(18)
Thus, by equation (14), welfare marginally increases in either case.
At first glance, the lower bound on the integral
∫ Q?
0
P2(u, k
?)du in the case
of P12 > 0 may appear quite restrictive since it incorporates the output and
quality level of the unregulated equilibrium. However, there is a large class
of inverse demand functions which will satisfy this assumption automatically.
Indeed, if P2 is constant, linearly increasing, or increasing and strictly concave
in Q, the assumption will be satisfied. The function could also be strictly
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convex in certain regions as well, as long as it spends a sufficient amount of
“time” above the ray defined by ζ(u).
2.3.2 Department of Justice Criticism of MQS
Recall the objection of the Department of Justice to quality standards on
agricultural produce such as Michigan cherries. Presumably, the Department
disregarded the suboptimal quality which arises when consumers cannot trace
a basket of cherries to the farm which produced it.
In a world where consumers care nothing about quality, the Department
of Justice’s reasoning makes sense. Suppose that P2(Q,R) = 0 for all (Q,R)
and maintain all other assumptions.7 It is straightforward to verify existence
of a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2.5 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium which is symmetric
and in which each firm produces a positive amount of the minimum quality.
Proof See Appendix B.
An increase in the MQS raises the per unit cost of every firm and reduces ev-
ery firm’s output. Since output of unregulated oligopolists is suboptimal, this
policy lowers social welfare. This can be verified formally by re-examining
equations (14) and (15). Since P2 = P12 = 0, these equations imply that
dQ
dk¯
< 0 and dW
dk¯
< 0 for any k¯ > 0. Thus, a minimum quality standard only
serves to lower both output and economic welfare, which is exactly what the
Department of Justice forewarns.
7Since P2 = 0 it follows that P12 = 0 as well.
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Why might firms nonetheless press the government to impose an MQS?
Such standards raise per unit costs of every firm. Seade (1985) identified
a necessary and sufficient condition for a cost increase to raise the profit
of every firm in an industry of Cournot competitors. Kotchen and Salant
(2009) demonstrate that this condition is equivalent to local convexity of the
total revenue function. If this condition holds and an equilibrium exists, firms
would have an incentive to press for an MQS even if consumers cared nothing
about quality. If consumers do value quality, firms benefit from an MQS not
merely because of the price increase induced by the reduction in aggregate
output but because of the increase in price induced by the improvement in
quality. Assuming that a Nash equilibrium exists in our model under the
Seade condition, that condition would be sufficient (but no longer necessary)
for firms to profit from an MQS.
2.3.3 Additional Policy Results
See Appendix C for additional policy considerations, including minimum
quantity standards, taxes, and subsidies.
3 International Trade
Until now, we have assumed that consumers have no information about the
source of the experience good. In many applications, however, consumers can
distinguish the region (country, state, or province) of origin. In this section,
we show how our benchmark case can be modified to take account of this
alternative specification.
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Suppose there are N countries. In country j, nj firms produce the expe-
rience good. The country in which a firm is located is known to consumers.
Consumers form a view about the quality of the goods emanating from the
particular country but cannot trace a good to a particular firm within that
country.
The players in the game are the
∑N
j=1 nj firms. Each of them sets quality
(kij) and quantity (qij) simultaneously. Since consumers cannot distinguish
firms within country j, every firm in a given country sells its experience good
at the same price (P j) and their merchandise has the same reputed quality
(Rj). Given the strategy profile, {kij, qij} for i = 1, . . . , nj and j = 1, . . . , N,
firms in country j develop a reputation for quality equal to the quantity-
weighted average of their qualities:
Rj =
nj∑
i=1
qij
Qj
kij. (19)
We specify consumer utility to generate an inverse demand curve for
each country which is strictly increasing in that country’s reputed quality,
strictly decreasing and strictly concave in world output of the experience
good, and additively separable in the two variables. In particular, assume
every consumer gets net utility u from purchasing one unit of the experience
good of reputed quality R at price p: u = θR− p. Consumers can purchase a
substitute which provides a reservation utility, and they buy the experience
good if and only if it provides higher net utility than the outside option.
Consumers have the same θ but differ in their reservation utilities.
Consumers observe each country’s reputation for quality. The price they
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pay depends on the worldwide supply of the experience goods. Suppose
that, given the distribution of reservation utilities, a utility of U(Q) must
be offered to attract Q customers to the experience good. We assume that
U(Q) is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice differentiable and that
U(0) = 0.8 Price adjusts in each country so consumers are indifferent about
the country from which they import the experience good. Every purchaser
receives net utility U(Q). Inframarginal buyers strictly prefer the experience
good to their outside option while the marginal buyer is indifferent between
the experience good and the outside option since both yield net utility U(Q).
More formally, let P˜ j(Q,Rj) = θRj − U(Q), for j = 1, . . . , N. Then, the
inverse demand of country j is given by:
P j(Q,Rj) =
 P˜
j(Q,Rj); if Q < U−1(θRj)
0; if Q ≥ U−1(θRj).
(20)
Hence, we can see that the inverse demand curve is additively separable over
the set {(Q,Rj)|Q < U−1(θRj)}.
Consider the game where each firm i (i = 1, . . . , nj) in country j (j =
1, . . . , N) simultaneously chooses its output and quality to maximize the
following payoff function:
qij[P (qij +Q−ij, Rj)− c(kij)]. (21)
We define firm i’s profit whenever it is inactive (qij = 0) as zero. This
8Formally, let µ be a σ-finite measure on [0,∞). Define Q(U) = ∫ U
0
dµ. We assume that
Q(0) = 0 and that Q(U) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
Let U(Q) ≡ Q−1(U).
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assignment never conflicts with (21) since that equation, evaluated at qij = 0,
gives the same result when Q−ij > 0 and is undefined when Q−ij = 0.
Since firm i maximizes profits, its decisions must satisfy the following pair
of complementary slackness (denoted c.s.) conditions for Q−ij > 0:
qij ≥ 0, P (Q,Rj)− c(kij) + qijP j1 (Q,Rj) + qijP j2 (Q,Rj)
∂Rj
∂qij
≤ 0, c.s. (22)
kij ≥ 0, qij[P j2 (Q,Rj)
∂Rj
∂kij
− c′(kij)] ≤ 0, c.s. (23)
where, from (19), ∂R
j
∂kij
= qij/Q
j and ∂R
j
∂qij
= (kij − Rj)/Qj. First-order condi-
tions (22) and (23) are the counterparts in the international case of equations
(7) and (8) in the benchmark case. We again assume that the profit function
of each firm, given the other firms’ strategies, is pseudoconcave.9 We can
establish the following counterpart to Theorem 2.2:
Theorem 3.1 In the international model, there exist non-trivial Nash equi-
libria.10 Each includes at least one active country. Across all equilibria, the
same countries are active. Moreover, in each active country j, every pro-
ducer of the experience good sells the same unique, strictly positive amount
(qj > 0) with the same unique strictly positive quality (kj > 0).
Proof See Appendix D.
In contrast to the benchmark case, uniqueness of the output and quality
choice within active countries is assured here because the inverse demand
curve is assumed to be additively separable.
9Although we have assumed a specific functional form, this should be satisfied as long
as U(Q) and c(k) are sufficiently convex.
10Again, trivial equilibria are those in which firms receive a price of zero for the product.
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Replacing the inverse demand curve and its partial derivatives by equiva-
lent expressions and utilizing the fact that every firm within country j makes
the same choices, we can re-write the first-order conditions (22) and (23) as
follows:
θRj − U(Q)− c(kj)− qjU ′(Q) = 0 (24)
and
θ
1
nj
− c′(kj) = 0. (25)
Equations (24) and (25) are the counterparts of equations (9) and (10) in
the benchmark case.
Equation (25), which holds for firms in each country j, implies that a
country with a larger number of firms exporting the experience good (the
“larger country”) will export lower- quality goods. Since prices adjust so
that consumers are indifferent about the source of their imports, the exports
of larger countries must sell for lower prices. This in turn insures that every
exporter in a larger country has lower profit and output as the following
argument shows. In the equilibrium any firm offering quality k earns profit
per unit of θk−U(Q)− c(k). Since this function is strictly concave in quality
and peaks at k∗, the implicit solution to θ = c′(k∗), in equilibrium every firm
will choose a quality kj < k
∗. Therefore, the profit per unit at each firm in
a group rises if the common quality of every firm in that group increases.
It follows that firms in larger countries will have lower profit per unit. But
equation (24) implies that any firm with a lower profit per unit produces less
output and hence earns lower total profit.11
11In this model, it is assumed that firms producing in one country cannot disguise
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In the limiting case where every country has the same number of firms,
quality, price, output, and profit are the same at every firm regardless of its
location.
3.1 Two Policy Implications
In the international case, unlike the benchmark case, consumers are assumed
to observe the country of origin of the experience good although not the
identity of the firm which produced it. This raises a fundamental question:
what are the positive and normative effects of giving each consumer the
information with which to classify more finely the source of the imported
good? For simplicity, we assume that before consumers receive the finer
information, every one of N groups (or “countries”) contains nj = n firms;
after the new information arrives, these same nN firms are divided equally
among N ′ > N groups so that each new group contains fewer firms.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose a labeling program permits consumers to classify firms
into more groups of equal size, each with fewer firms. Then quality, quantity,
and profit will increase at every firm and the utility of every consumer of the
experience good will increase as well.
their products as originating in another country where firms have a better reputation and
earn higher profits. Presumably this implicitly requires that the government identify and
prohibit such deceptions since they would be profitable. “Under EU law, for example,
use of the word Champagne on wine labels is intended exclusively for wines produced
in the Champagne region of France under the strict regulations of the region’s Appel-
lation of Controlled Origin . . . Customs agents and border patrols throughout Europe
have seized and destroyed thousands of bottles in the last four years illegally bearing the
Champagne name, including product from the United States, Argentina, Russia, Armenia,
Brazil and Ethiopia.” http://www.reuters.com/do/emailArticle?articleId=US208562+10-
Jan-2008+BW20080110
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Proof If every firm is a member of a smaller group, world production must
increase. For, suppose it decreased. Then fewer consumers would buy the
good, and it must provide lower utility. But since each firm shares its collec-
tive reputation with fewer competitors, every firm will increase its quality,
and hence the reputed quality of its group will increase. But since profit per
unit is increasing in the common quality of the group, the sum of the first
three terms in equation (24) must increase. Since the second factor of the
last term decreases, however, that equation would hold only if each firm’s
output (qj) increased. But then world output would increase, contradicting
our hypothesis.
Consequently, world sales of the experience good must strictly increase
and hence so must production at each firm. Since each firm belongs to a
smaller group, each firm will increase its quality. As for profitability, since
both factors in the last term of equation (24) increase, net profit per unit (the
first three terms of that equation) must increase. Therefore profit at every
firm will rise. To absorb the increased production, the utility each consumer
receives from the experience good must increase by enough to attract the
requisite number of consumers away from their outside options.
Profits, and hence social welfare, would be higher if every consumer rec-
ognized not only that a product was imported from a particular country but
also that it was made by someone in a particular region of that country (or,
better yet, by a particular ethnic group within that region). For, the smaller
the number of firms in a category recognized by every consumer, the less
incentive each firm will have to shirk in the provision of quality.
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We conclude our discussion of the international case by showing why
a government should want to impose a minimum quality standard on the
quality of the experience good its firms export. Suppose one country imposes
such a standard, while other countries choose not to regulate. We assume
that the standard (k¯) is binding but is not set as high as a firm would
choose if it were the only domestic producer and hence its products could be
readily identified by consumers. That is, we assume k¯ < k∗, where k∗ solves
θ = c′(k∗). We establish that:
Theorem 3.3 The imposition of a minimum quality standard by one country
raises the output and profits of its exporters while lowering the output and
profits of unregulated exporters elsewhere. Overall, world output expands.
Quality rises in the country with regulation and remains unchanged elsewhere.
Imposition of the minimum quality standard benefits every consumer of the
experience good.
Proof The imposition of the standard must strictly increase world produc-
tion of the experience good. For, suppose the contrary. Suppose aggregate
quantity falls or remains constant. Then the utility which consumers get
from the experience good must weakly decrease. In every country with un-
regulated firms, exporters would maintain quality since equation (25) still
holds. So if their exports provide weakly less net utility, the prices of their
exports (P j = θkj − U(Q)) must weakly increase. Since the per unit profit
(P j − c(kj)) would then weakly increase, equation (24) implies that output
at each regulated firm must weakly increase. As for the regulated firms, their
per unit profit must strictly increase since the standard raised quality and,
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by assumption, was not excessive (k¯ < k∗). Equation (24) then implies that
output at each regulated firm strictly increases. But then we have a contra-
diction: aggregate output cannot weakly decrease as we hypothesized since
that implies the sum of the individual firm outputs would strictly increase.
So the imposition of a minimum quality standard in one country must
cause world output of the experience good to strictly increase and hence must
cause the net utility of every consumer of the good to increase. Since the
quality of the unregulated firms does not change, their prices, profit per unit,
output and total profits must fall. Since aggregate output expands despite
the contraction at every unregulated firm, output at every regulated firm
must increase. But, as equation (24) implies, regulated firms would expand
output only if their profit per unit also increased. Hence, their total profits
would also increase. Since profit per unit increases at each regulated firm, its
price per unit must increase by more than enough to offset the increased cost
per unit of producing the higher quality mandated by the minimum quality
standard.
Intuitively, the minimum quality standard imposed by one country creates a
competitive advantage for its firms since it reassures buyers about the quality
and safety of products originating there.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered markets where consumers cannot discern a prod-
uct’s quality prior to purchase and can never identify the firm which produced
the good. We considered both the benchmark case where consumers do not
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know the country of origin of the experience good and the international case
in which consumers do know it. When buyers who care about the quality
and safety of the products they purchase are informed about the country of
origin of the experience goods available to them, firms in those countries are
motivated to improve the quality and safety of their merchandise. As a re-
sult, both profits and welfare increase. An MQS can secure further benefits.
In the absence of such regulations, a country with a larger number of pro-
ducers of the experience good will export shoddier products at lower prices.
If one country imposes such regulations, consumers benefit not only from
the enhanced quality of that country’s exports but from the opportunity to
buy other countries’ exports which sell for diminished prices despite their
unchanged quality. The minimum quality standard imposed by one coun-
try raises the profits of the firms compelled to obey them and reduces the
profits of competing exporters with the misfortune to be located in countries
without such regulations.
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A Proof of Theorem 2.2
We proceed as follows. We first demonstrate that there exists at least one
symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game. We then show that any Nash
equilibrium (symmetric or otherwise) of the game must be interior. Finally,
we show that there can be no asymmetric Nash equilibria.
Lemma A.1 There exists a non-trivial symmetric equilibrium.
Proof Assume each firm chooses the same pair (q, k). Given this symmetry,
we can write the Kuhn-Tucker conditions as:
q ≥ 0, P (Q, k) + qP1(Q, k)− c(k) ≤ 0, c.s. (26)
q = Q/n, (27)
and
k ≥ 0, q[P2(Q, k)− nc′(k)] ≤ 0, c.s. (28)
where R = k.
To begin, for Q < Q¯(0) we let kˆ(Q) be the unique solution to the equa-
tion P (Q, k) = c(k). We know that there exists a unique solution since
P (Q, 0) > 0, c(0) = 0, inverse demand is strictly concave in quality, and the
cost function is strictly convex in quality. We see that:
dkˆ
dQ
=
P1(Q, kˆ)
−[P2(Q, kˆ)− c′(kˆ)]
. (29)
But for all Q < Q¯(0), the unit margin is strictly decreasing at (Q, kˆ(Q)),
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which implies that P2(Q, kˆ) − c′(kˆ) < 0. Since inverse demand is strictly
decreasing in Q, we conclude that dkˆ
dQ
< 0.
Next, we consider equations (26) and (27). Given a particular quality
k, we would like to study the solution to these complementary slackness
conditions, which we denote by (q˘(k), Q˘(k)). Note that if k ≥ kˆ(0), then
P (Q, k) − c(k) ≤ 0 for all Q and the solution to (26) and (27) is Q˘(k) =
q˘(k) = 0. Now suppose that k < kˆ(0). Then P (0, k) − c(k) > 0. Moreover,
since P (Q, k) = 0 for all Q ≥ Qˆ(k), where P (Qˆ(k), k) = c(k), the solution
to (26) is q = 0 for all Q ≥ Qˆ(k). Finally, by totally differentiating equation
(26) with respect to Q, we find that for all Q < Qˆ(k):
dq
dQ
= −P1(Q, k) + qP11(Q, k)
P1(Q, k)
< 0. (30)
So consider the function f(Q) = nq(Q) where q(Q) is the solution to (26)
given Q. We are looking for a fixed point of this function. We know that
this continuous function strictly decreases from f(0) > 0 to f(Qˆ(k)) = 0 and
f(Q) = 0 for all Q ≥ Qˆ(k). This implies that the curve will cross the 45o line
at some 0 < Q < Qˆ(k) < Q¯(k). Then (Q/n,Q) defines the desired solution.
We conclude that we have solution curves Q˘(k) and q˘(k) = Q˘(k)/n which
are defined for 0 ≤ k ≤ kˆ(0). Since P1(Q, k)(1 + 1n) + QnP11(Q, k) < 0 at
each solution, it follows from the implicit function theorem that these curves
are continuous over this interval. Putting everything together, we note that
Q˘(k) is bounded above by some constant M .
Let us consider the solution curve k˘(Q) to the equation (28). If the firm
is inactive (q = 0), then any quality choice solves equation (28). How-
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ever, we will assume (without, as we will show, loss of generality) that
k˘(0) = limQ→0 k˘(Q). Thus, k˘(Q) is continuous at Q = 0. Next, note that
for any Q ∈ (0, Q¯(0)), the left hand side of (28) is strictly positive at k = 0
since P2(Q, 0) > 0 and c
′(0) = 0; strictly negative for k → ∞; and contin-
uous. Hence, there is at least one root. Moreover, since the left-hand side
is strictly decreasing in k, there is exactly one root for any Q ∈ (0, Q¯(0)).
Therefore, k˘(Q) is a well-defined positive function for all 0 ≤ Q < Q¯(0).
Since P22(Q, k) − nc′′(k) < 0, by the implicit function theorem it is contin-
uous. Finally, note that for all Q ∈ [0, Q¯(0)), at the point (Q, kˆ(Q)) the
cost curve must be steeper than the price curve since the cost function is
strictly increasing and strictly convex away from 0, while inverse demand
is strictly increasing and concave in quality. In particular, this means that
k˘(Q) < kˆ(Q) < kˆ(0) for all 0 ≤ Q < Q¯(0).
For Q ≥ Q¯(0), things are somewhat trickier. We first ignore the zero
solution to equation (28). Now consider the equation P˜2(Q¯(k˜), k)) = c
′(k)
and the corresponding solution curve k¯(k˜). If this curve has a fixed point,
denote the minimal one by k0.12 Since k¯(0) > 0 and the curve is continuous,
it follows that k¯(k˜) > k˜ for all 0 ≤ k˜ < k0. This in turn implies that for
Q ∈ [Q¯(0), Q¯(k0)), equation (28) has a non-trivial solution, which we denote
k˘(Q). Therefore, k˘(Q) exists and is continuous for all 0 ≤ Q < Q¯(k0).
Moreover, k˘(Q)→ k0 as Q→ Q¯(k0).
To complete the proof, we define T (Q) = Q˘(k˘(Q)) − Q. We need to
consider two cases. First suppose that k¯(k˜) does not have a fixed point.
Then k˘(Q) exists and is continuous for all Q, which means that T (Q) is
12Note that if P˜12 ≤ 0, then k¯(k˜) will have a unique fixed point.
31
continuous for all Q. Now k˘(0) < kˆ(0), which implies T (0) = Q˘(k˘(0)) > 0.
Since Q˘(k) is bounded above, it follows that limQ→∞ T (Q) = −∞. Therefore,
by the intermediate value theorem, we conclude that Q˘(k˘(Q)) has a fixed
point Q? and an associated image k? = k˘(Q?). Next consider the case where
k¯(k˜) does have a fixed point. We again know that T (0) > 0. We also know
that Q˘(k0) < Q¯(k0) and k˘(Q) → k0 as Q → Q¯(k0). Consequently, we
can conclude that limQ→Q¯(k0) T (Q) = Q˘(k?) − Q¯(k?) < 0. Again, by the
intermediate value theorem, we conclude that Q˘(k˘(Q)) has a fixed point Q?
and an associated image k? = k˘(Q?).
Hence, in both cases we are able to find a fixed point of the function
Q˘(k˘(Q)). Pseudoconcavity of the profit functions therefore implies that a
firm’s strategy (Q?/n, k?) is profit-maximizing and hence the profile of these
strategies forms a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The following two lemmas demonstrate that any non-trivial Nash equilibrium
must be interior.
Lemma A.2 There can be no non-trivial equilibrium (symmetric or other-
wise) in which a firm produces a positive quantity of the minimum quality.
Proof If it is optimal to produce at minimum quality (ki = 0), then since
c′(0) = 0 condition (8) requires that P2(Q,R)
qi
Q
≤ 0. But each of the factors
to the left of this inequality is strictly positive since, by hypothesis, qi > 0
and we are considering non-trivial equilibria. So the inequality can never
hold. Therefore, every firm with qi > 0 must have ki > 0.
Intuitively, since the cost function is flat at the origin but inverse demand
is strictly increasing in quality when the price is non-zero, an active firm
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producing a minimal quality can always increase his profit by marginally
increasing his quality choice. At the margin, costs will remain the same but
the price will increase.
Lemma A.3 There can be no non-trivial equilibrium (symmetric or other-
wise) in which some firm is inactive.
Proof First, suppose that all the other firms produce nothing (Q−i = 0). If
firm i also produces nothing, it would earn a payoff of zero. But this cannot
be optimal. For, by unilaterally setting ki = 0 and 0 < qi < Q¯(0), its payoff
would increase to qiP (qi, 0) > 0. So there can be no Nash equilibrium with
qi = 0 when Q−i = 0. 13
Nor can there be a non-trivial Nash equilibrium with qi = 0 whenQ−i > 0.
In that case, one or more of the rival firms is producing a strictly positive
amount. Label as firm j the active firm with the smallest quality. Hence,
kj − R ≤ 0. Since firm j produces a strictly positive amount, its first-order
condition in (7) must hold with equality. Since the terms qjP1(Q,R) and
qjP2(Q,R)(kj − R)/Q are respectively strictly and weakly negative, (7) im-
plies P (Q,R) − c(kj) > 0. But since the cost function is strictly increasing,
P (Q,R) − c(0) > 0 and this same complementary slackness condition (7),
which must hold for firm i as well, implies that qi > 0, contradicting the
hypothesis that qi = 0.
From the two lemmas above, we conclude that the symmetric equilibria
found previously must be interior. We conclude the proof of the theorem
13Our discarding of all but one value for k˘(0) when a firm is inactive could have resulted
in the elimination of additional fixed points. However, since every fixed point is a Nash
equilibrium and we have just established from first principles that there are no Nash
equilibria with any firm inactive, in fact we could not have eliminated any equilibria.
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by demonstrating that in no non-trivial equilibrium do any two firms choose
different qualities or different quantities.
Lemma A.4 There exist no pure strategy asymmetric non-trivial Nash equi-
libria.
Proof Since any equilibrium must be interior, the pair of first-order condi-
tions for each firm must hold with equality. These imply that the following
equation must hold in any equilibrium:
[ki − (R− QP1(Q,R)
P2(Q,R)
)]c′(ki) + {P (Q,R)− c(ki)} = 0. (31)
Define the left-hand side as Γ(ki;Q,R). For each equilibrium, there may be a
different (Q,R). But given those aggregate variables, every firm (i = 1, . . . , n)
will have Γ(ki;Q,R) = 0. However, this equation cannot have more than one
root. We see ∂Γ
∂ki
(ki;Q,R) = [ki− (R− QP1(Q,R)P2(Q,R) )]c′′(ki) and (31) requires that
at any root, the first factor in ∂Γ
∂ki
(ki;Q,R) must be strictly negative.
14
Hence, there can be no more than one root. So, for any given equilibrium
with its (Q,R) a unique ki satisfies equation (31). But since equation (31)
must hold for every firm, each firm must choose the same quality in this
equilibrium. Denote it k(Q,R). Moreover, since every firm will be active
and reputed quality will equal R = k(Q,R), equation (7) implies that qi =
P (Q,R)−c(k(Q,R)
−P1(Q,R) . Since the right-hand side of this equation is independent of
i, every firm will produce the same quantity in this equilibrium. Denote it
q(Q,R).
14The term in braces in (31) must be strictly positive since qi > 0 (from Lemma A.3),
condition (26) therefore holds with equality, and P1 < 0 by assumption.
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B Proof of Theorem 2.5
First note that there can be no equilibrium in which any active firm sets its
quality above the minimum (k = 0). This follows since such a firm could
strictly reduce its costs while preserving its gross revenue by dropping its
quality to the minimum. Hence, the only candidates for equilibria are strat-
egy profiles where every active firm produces at the lowest quality level.
Standard treatments in the Cournot oligopoly literature establish that there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium when every firm has the identical con-
stant marginal cost (c(0) in our case). In equilibrium, every firm produces
qi = Q
∗/n, where Q∗ solves: P (Q, 0) + Q
n
P1(Q, 0) − c(0) = 0. To verify
that the strategy profile {ki = 0, qi = Q∗/n} for i = 1, . . . , n forms a Nash
equilibrium when firms choose quality as well as quantity, we must check
that no firm could profitably deviate by raising quality above the minimum
and altering quantity at the same time. Since consumers do not value qual-
ity, such a deviation affects price only because it alters total output. Since
increases in quality raise costs, the firm can do better by simply changing
output and keeping quality at its minimum level; but, as the standard proofs
establish, no such deviation is ever profitable. Therefore, the strategy profile
in which each firm produces an output Q?/n of minimum quality forms a
Nash equilibrium.
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C Additional Policy Results
We begin with binding minimum quantity standards. Suppose the regulator
wants a total industry output of Q¯. Then, in practice, the regulator will
set the standard at Q¯/n. We note that firms will set quality such that
P2(Q¯, k) = nc
′(k). Given this, we find:
dk
dQ¯
=
P12(Q¯, k)
nc′′(k)− P22(Q¯, k) . (32)
Thus, if inverse demand is additively separable quality is unchanged. If
P12 > 0 quality increases and if P12 < 0 quality decreases. These results are
quite intuitive. Let us now think about welfare. We see that:
dW
dQ¯
= {P (Q¯, k)− c(k)}+ dk
dQ¯
[
∫ Q¯
0
P2(u, k)du− Q¯c′(k)], (33)
Let k? denote the quality of the unregulated equilibrium. If inverse demand is
additively separable, the regulator can set Q¯ to solve P (Q, k?) = c(k?). This
will maximize the welfare achievable under a minimum quantity standard.
If n = 1, it will coincide with the welfare achieved by a social planner. If
P12 < 0, we know by the reasoning above that for any Q¯ set,
∫ Q¯
0
P2(u, k)du−
Q¯c′(k) > 0. Thus as long as the standard is such that firms do not shut down,
i.e. the unit margin is positive, any further marginal increase will result in a
welfare gain from the higher output, but a welfare loss from the consequent
degraded quality. Finally, if P12 > 0 and the standard again is set such that
firms do not shut down, marginal increases in the regulation will result in
marginally higher welfare as long as
∫ Q¯
0
P (u, k)du > 0. As previously noted,
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this will occur if P2 is sufficiently concave in Q.
Last but not least, we consider the role of taxes and subsidies. Since
command and control regulations tend to have large enforcement costs as-
sociated with them, it is important to understand if similar effects could be
achieved through the use of fiscal regulation. Given a tax T , the firm’s first
order conditions are:
P (Q, k)− c(k)− T = −Q
n
P1(Q, k) (34)
P2(Q, k) = nc
′(k). (35)
Implicitly differentiating, we find that an increase in the rate has the following
impact on quality:
dk
dT
=
P12(Q, k)
dQ
dT
nc′′(k)− P22(Q, k) . (36)
Now let:
A(Q, k) = P1(Q, k)(1 +
1
n
) +
Q
n
P11(Q, k) (37)
B(Q, k) =
P12(Q, k)
nc′′(k)− P22(Q, k) [(n− 1)c
′(k) +
Q
n
P12(Q, k)]. (38)
After some tedious calculations, we find that the marginal impact on industry
output is given by:
dQ
dT
=
1
A(Q, k) +B(Q, k)
. (39)
Given these results, we can think about optimal policy. We include govern-
ment revenues in the welfare function, so that the expression for welfare is
unchanged. If P12 = 0, then neither a tax nor a subsidy has any effect on
quality. Consequently, firms should be subsidized so as to achieve the socially
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optimal output. Let us now suppose that P12 < 0. Note that A(Q, k) < 0.
When |P12| is small, B(Q, k) < 0. Thus, imposing a tax will shrink output
but increase quality. Subsidies will have the opposite effect. In both cases,
there will be welfare effects moving in opposite directions. For instance, when
a tax is imposed there will be a welfare loss from the reduced output, but a
welfare gain from the enhanced quality. Interestingly, for P12 sufficiently neg-
ative, a tax may actually increase industry output. In this case, enhancing
quality must be achieved through a subsidy. We turn finally to P12 > 0 and
suppose that P2 is sufficiently concave in Q so as to recognize welfare gains
from increases in quality. For a small P12, welfare gains must be achieved
through subsidy, while for P12 sufficiently large, a tax must be utilized. We
conclude that fiscal regulation can certainly improve welfare. However, regu-
lators must accurately measure demand since the optimal policy is sensitive
to the magnitude of the cross partial. This is especially true when P12 > 0
and there are not competing welfare effects.
To conclude, it appears that an MQS offers the best regulatory option.
Indeed, they result in enhanced quality and increased output for a wide
range of inverse demand functions, including those with a sufficiently small
negative cross partial. This is significant since no other regulatory option
considered can achieve both increased output and enhanced quality with then
cross partial is negative. Rather, regulations will always lead to competing
welfare effects. However, minimum quality standards and taxes/subsidies
become viable options when the cross partial is non-negative, noting of course
then inverse demand is additively separable, such measures have no impact
on quality. Yet when the cross partial is positive, these regulations can
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increase both output and quality, just as in the case of an MQS. Consequently,
if regulators feed that command and control regulations are too costly for
the government to implement and have estimated inverse demand to have
a positive cross partial, fiscal regulation should be seriously considered. As
discussed, though, the key to a successful policy is to get an accurate measure
of demand. Given the magnitude of the cross partial in relation to other
quantities, either a subsidy or a tax should be implemented.
D Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof follows the same structure of the proof of Theorem 2.2.
Lemma D.1 There exists a non-trivial equilibrium in which in each country
j, every producer of the experience good is either active or inactive. If a
country is active, each firm sells the same unique strictly positive amount
(qj > 0) with the same unique strictly positive quality (kj > 0). There is at
least one active country.
Proof Given the symmetry we are considering, we can write the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions as:
qj ≥ 0, P j(Q, kj) + qjP j1 (Q, kj)− c(kj) ≤ 0, c.s. (40)
Q =
N∑
j=1
njqj, (41)
and
kj ≥ 0, qj[P j2 (Q, kj)− njc′(kj)] ≤ 0, c.s. (42)
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where Rj = kj.
To begin, consider the solution to equation (42) given a particular Q and
qj. If the firm is inactive (qj = 0), then any quality choice will solve the
equation. Now let k˜j = (c
′)−1(θ/nj). If the firm is active, it is clear that for
all 0 ≤ Q < Q¯(k˜j), k˜j is the unique non-zero solution to equation (42). For
Q ≥ Q¯(k˜j), there is no non-zero solution.
Let us now consider the system of equations given by (40) and (41) when
kj = k˜j for all j. Note that P
j(0, k˜j)−c(k˜j) = θk˜j−c(k˜j) > 0 for all j.15 Next,
define Qˆ(k˜j) < Q¯(k˜j) such that P (Qˆ(k˜j), k˜j) = c(k˜j). Then the solution to
(40) is qj = 0 for all Q ≥ Qˆ(k˜j). By totally differentiating equation (40) with
respect to Q, we find that for Q < Qˆ(k˜j):
dqj
dQ
= −P
j
1 (Q, k˜j) + qjP
j
11(Q, k˜j)
P j1 (Qk˜j)
= −U
′(Q) + qjU ′′(Q)
U ′(Q)
< 0. (43)
Now let f(Q) =
∑N
j=1 njqj(Q) and Q
H = max{Qˆ(k˜1), ..., Qˆ(k˜N)}. Then
f(Q) is continuous and strictly decreases from f(0) > 0 to f(QH) = 0 and
f(Q) = 0 for all Q ≥ QH . Thus the curve will cross the 45o line exactly
once at some 0 < Q? < QH . Let k?j = k˜j and q
?
j = qj(Q
?) for all j. If
Q? < Qˆ(k˜j) < Q¯(k˜j), then q
?
j > 0 and if Q
? ≥ Qˆ(k˜j), then q?j = 0. The
profile ((k?j )
N
j=1, (q
?
j )
N
j=1, Q
?) satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions.
Note that at least one country will be active since Q? < QH .
Since by assumption the profit function of each firm is pseudoconcave,
the specified solution constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
15Let kˆ = (c′)−1(θ). Then since c(0) = 0 and the cost function is convex, we know
k− c(k) is maximized at kˆ. Since k˜j ≤ kˆ for all j, it follows that θk˜j − c(k˜j) > 0 for all j.
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The following two lemmas demonstrate that in any non-trivial equilibrium,
active firms do not produce the minimum quality and active countries cannot
have inactive firms.
Lemma D.2 There can be no non-trivial equilibrium (symmetric or other-
wise) in which a firm produces a positive quantity of the minimum quality.
Proof If it is optimal to produce at minimum quality (kij = 0), then since
c′(0) = 0 condition (23) requires that P2(Q,Rj)
qij
Qj
≤ 0. But each of the
factors to the left of this inequality is strictly positive since, by hypothesis,
qij > 0 and we are considering non-trivial equilibria. So the inequality can
never hold. Therefore, every firm with qij > 0 must have kij > 0.
Intuitively, since the cost function is flat at the origin but inverse demand
is strictly increasing in quality when the price is non-zero, an active firm
producing a minimal quality can always increase his profit by marginally
increasing his quality choice. At the margin, costs will remain the same but
the price will increase.
Lemma D.3 There can be no non-trivial equilibrium (symmetric or other-
wise) in which an active country can have an inactive firm.
Proof Suppose that qij = 0 and Q
j > 0. In that case, one or more of the
rival firms is producing a strictly positive amount. Label as firm i′ the active
firm with the smallest quality. Hence, ki′j − Rj ≤ 0. Since firm i′ produces
a strictly positive amount, its first-order condition in (22) must hold with
equality. Since the terms qi′jP
j
1 (Q,R
j) and qi′jP
j
2 (Q,R
j)(ki′j − Rj)/Q are
respectively strictly and weakly negative, (22) implies P j(Q,Rj)−c(ki′j) > 0.
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But since the cost function is strictly increasing, P (Q,Rj) − c(0) > 0 and
this same complementary slackness condition (7), which must hold for firm i
as well, implies that qij > 0, contradicting the hypothesis that qij = 0.
Given the previous results, we have the following lemma.
Lemma D.4 There exist no non-trivial pure strategy Nash equilibria in which
firms in active countries produce different qualities and/or outputs.
Proof Consider an active country j. By the two previous lemmas, the first-
order conditions of each firm in this country must hold with equality. That
is, the following equations must hold in equilibrium:
[kij − (Rj − QU
′(Q)
θRj
)]c′(kij) + {θRj − U(Q)− c(kij)} = 0. (44)
Define the left-hand side as Γj(kij;Q,R
j). In equilibrium, every firm (i =
1, . . . , nj) will have Γ
j(kij;Q,R
j) = 0. However, this equation cannot have
more than one root. We see ∂Γ
j
∂kij
(kij;Q,R
j) = [kij − (Rj − QU ′(Q)θRj )]c′′(kij)
and (44) requires that at any root, the first factor in ∂Γ
j
∂kij
(kij;Q,R
j) must be
strictly negative.16
Hence, there can be no more than one root. So, for any given equilibrium
with its (Q,Rj) a unique kij satisfies equation (44). But since equation (44)
must hold for every firm, each firm must choose the same quality in this
equilibrium. Denote it kj(Q,R
j). Moreover, since every firm will be active
and reputed quality will equal Rj = kj(Q,R
j), equation (22) implies that
16The term in braces in (44) must be strictly positive since qij > 0 (from Lemma D.3),
condition (40) therefore holds with equality, and P1 < 0 by assumption.
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qij =
θRj−U(Q)−c(kj(Q,Rj))
−U ′(Q) . Since the right-hand side of this equation is inde-
pendent of i, every firm will produce the same quantity in this equilibrium.
Denote it qj(Q,R
j).
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